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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the U.S. rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, Canada acknowledging 
that it is unlikely to meet its Kyoto commitments, and Mexico, as a 
developing state, not being required to reduce its GHG emissions within 
the Kyoto framework, the state of climate-change law and policy in 
North America for the past decade has looked bleak.  However, as the 
trajectory of global climate-change governance after 2012 shifts towards 
a multi-level, multi-track framework, there may be greater opportunities 
for trilateral cooperation on climate change in North America.  There is 
increased momentum for greater cooperation in climate change arising 
from the election in the U.S. of Barack Obama, who has committed to 
“re-engage” with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) process.1  Mexico has signaled its willingness to 
accept binding, long-term emissions-reduction targets within the UNFCCC 
framework.2  The Canadian government, for its part, has indicated its 
desire to negotiate a continental “cap-and-trade” agreement with the 
U.S. and Mexico.3  Moreover, at the sub-national level, constituent 
governments are increasingly looking to their counterparts within and 
outside the state to coordinate greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation activities.4 
In light of these developments, this Article surveys the current 
bilateral and trilateral initiatives aimed at GHG emission reductions in 
North America with a view to assessing the nature and potential role of 
 1. Organizing for America: BarackObama.com, Energy, http://www.barackobama.com/ 
issues/newenergy/index.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).  That momentum has been 
furthered by legislative action on the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
which would, inter alia, set new standards for power generation, accelerate development 
of clean energy technologies, fund energy efficiency programs, and create a cap-and-
trade program for U.S. greenhouse gases.  See generally H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., available at 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/text. 
 2. Mexico made this commitment, which is conditioned on financial and 
technological assistance, at the Fourteenth Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties.  Chris Holly, Mexico Sets Greenhouse Cut of 50 Percent By 2050—If Aid 
Provided, THE ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.ccap.org/index.php? 
component=news&id=158. 
 3. David Ljunggren, Canada Wants North America Cap-and-Trade System, REUTERS, 
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE4AI7012 0081119. 
 4. See discussion of Western Climate Initiative infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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regional climate-change law and policy within a broader global 
framework. In this context, by regional cooperation, we mean cooperation 
organized on a North American scale.  In pursuit of this objective, this 
Article seeks to identify, first, how climate-change mitigation may be 
regulated usefully on a regional scale and, second, the governance 
structures and institutions that may be drawn upon to create and 
implement regional cooperation on climate change.  Particular consideration 
is also given to the capacity of regional approaches to climate-change 
cooperation to meet the different climate-change objectives that Mexico 
has identified, given the less developed state of its economy. 
In order to frame the context of the discussion that follows, Part II 
provides a brief discussion of the current development of global climate-
change governance towards a more diffuse, multi-centric structure.  
Proceeding from the basis that regional environmental cooperation 
requires that the participating states have common policy objectives, Part 
III canvasses the international commitments, stated policy objectives, 
and existing policy structures addressing climate change in Canada, 
Mexico, and the U.S.  Because we aim to identify the broad contours of 
potential cooperation in addressing climate change, the particular 
commitments and policy approaches are described in summary form, 
with an emphasis on identifying areas of commonality. Part IV considers 
in greater detail the prospects for regional climate-change governance in 
North America.  Here, we seek to identify the potential forms of climate-
change regulation that are likely to benefit from regional cooperation.  
We also consider the potential of the principal existing regional environmental 
governance structures, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, to contribute to the formation 
and implementation of climate-change law and policy.  Finally, Part V 
considers the capacity for regional climate-change governance structures 
to meet Mexican climate-change objectives.  These structures include 
improved GHG reporting, nationally appropriate mitigation actions, 
continued economic development, access to technology, and improved 
climate-adaptation capabilities.  The conclusion describes a future research 
agenda for North American climate-change governance. 
II.  CONTEXT: MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-TRACK                                   
CLIMATE-CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
As the first commitment period—2008 to 2012—of the Kyoto 
Protocol draws to a close and states look towards the negotiation of a 
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new global compact on climate change, two important characteristics of 
the nature of climate-change governance are becoming apparent.  First, 
climate-change governance is becoming increasingly multi-level in its 
architecture.5  Whereas the UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol 
operate on a global scale, there are now numerous examples of climate-
change governance structures that involve actors both below and above 
the state, organized on multiple scales.  The European Union (EU) has 
chosen to implement its Kyoto Protocol obligations through regional 
measures and has, in fact, made collective commitments to reduce GHG 
emissions irrespective of the commitments of other states.6  The Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) is a 
further, albeit looser, example of regional climate-change cooperation.7  
In North America, sub-national governments have organized climate-
change initiatives on a sub-regional basis, with participating governments 
from both the U.S. and Canada, and a number of Mexican states are 
participating as observers.8 
The transnational dimension of sub-regional climate-change cooperation 
is significant because it demonstrates the potential for environmental 
cooperation beyond the state without the participation of national 
governments or, at least, without sub-national interests being aggregated 
at the national level.  In the case of North American climate-change law 
and policy, the lack of national leadership has led to the creation of a 
policy vacuum that sub-national governments are addressing.9  The 
decentralized nature of environmental governance and energy regulation 
in North America has facilitated this process since sub-national 
governments have significant pre-existing environmental responsibilities, 
 5. For theoretical discussion of multi-level governance in climate change, see 
generally Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance 
of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141 (2006) and Barry G. Rabe, 
Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance Systems, 20 GOVERNANCE: 
AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 423 (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Council Decision 406/2009/EC, Decision on the Effort of Member 
States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments Up to 2020, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 137 
(joint decision of European Parliament and European Council). 
 7. See generally Charter of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate, Jan. 11-13, 2006, http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/charter.pdf 
(Canada joined the APP in Nov. 2007). 
 8. For a description of cooperative efforts and a full list of members and 
observers, see, for example, Western Climate Initiative, Home Page, http://www.western 
climateinitiative.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
 9. BARRY G. RABE, REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: 
REVISITING MULTI-STATE COLLABORATION AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
TOOL 2-3 (2008), http://www.allacademic.com (change query type to “Authors” on left 
side of page; then type “Barry Rabe” and click “Go;” then click on title of paper) 
(presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association). 
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many of which overlap with climate change, such as air pollution, 
control over natural resources, and land-use decisions. Likewise, 
jurisdictional control over matters such as land-use and transportation 
planning, as well as local air quality, has given municipalities a platform 
from which to pursue local climate initiatives. 
The relationship between levels in multi-level governance structures is 
non-exclusive in the sense that different levels of government may 
address the same issues. Cooperation is also non-hierarchical, with 
cooperative activities being organized both vertically, between actors at 
different levels, and horizontally, between actors at the same level.  
California has, for example, entertained climate-change initiatives with 
both other states and other national governments.10 Similarly, New 
Jersey sought to provide opportunities for Dutch companies to obtain 
emissions trading credits for activities undertaken in New Jersey.11 
The second emerging characteristic is the increasingly multi-track 
nature of climate-change governance—that climate-change negotiations 
are no longer solely focused on extending the Kyoto Protocol beyond 
2012 and broadening participation in the GHG-reduction commitments 
found in the Protocol.12  There appears to be an international consensus 
that the UNFCCC should remain the principal basis upon which future 
international negotiations should go forward.13  Thus, the objectives and 
principles agreed to in the UNFCCC will provide a universal normative 
basis for future negotiations. However, the top-down “targets and 
timetables” approach adopted in the Kyoto Protocol is not likely to be 
 10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, UNITED KINGDOM AND CALIFORNIA 
ANNOUNCEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY COLLABORATION (2009), 
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/fact-sheet/united-kingdom-and-california-announcement-on-
climate-change-clean-energy-c/; David B. Hunter, The Future of U.S. Climate Change 
Policy, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 79, 96 (Steven 
Bernstein et al. eds., 2008). 
 11. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the U.S.: A 
Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 54, 68 (2006). 
 12. Daniel Bodansky, Targets and Timetables: Good Policy but Bad Politics?, in 
ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT 57, 59 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007). 
 13. The United Nations Climate Change Conference, Thirteenth Session, Bali, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Held 
in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007.  Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session.  FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 
2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf [hereinafter 
Bali Action Plan]; see Group of Eight [G8], G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders 
Declaration ¶ 22 (July 8, 2008), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/20 
08/doc/doc080714_en.html [hereinafter Summit Leaders Declaration]. 
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the exclusive approach taken.  The Bali Action Plan, which sets out the 
broad framework for future climate-change negotiations within the 
UNFCCC, recognizes that approaches to cooperative action on mitigation 
may take a number of different forms beyond economy-wide quantified 
emission-limitation and reduction commitments, including sector-specific 
actions as well as cooperation on technology development and transfer of 
technology.14  The approach adopted by the Group of Eight (G8), which 
includes all three North American governments, in the Declaration of 
Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate 
Change acknowledges the role of the UNFCCC as the global forum for 
climate-change negotiation, but it also stresses the importance of technology-
driven solutions, land-use change, and adaptation.15 
A multi-track climate framework means that states may negotiate 
multiple, overlapping sets of commitments in accordance with their 
specific national circumstances.16 States may have preferences for different 
approaches to climate-change mitigation, such as favoring carbon taxes 
over emissions trading or focusing on developing technology- based 
solutions.17  They may also differ in the degree to which they are willing to 
adopt legally binding, international commitments, with some states 
preferring soft-law commitments to hard-law commitments with strong 
compliance features.  In some cases, such as with the European Union 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS), states may choose 
to develop collective responses that are highly integrated with the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto.18 But as the APP illustrates, states may also 
choose to develop a framework that is largely parallel and supplementary to 
other international cooperative efforts. 
The pluralist trajectory of climate-change governance provides greater 
scope for regional initiatives that are oriented towards specific national 
 14. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 4. 
 15. G8, Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security 
and Climate Change ¶ 1 (July 9, 2008), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit 
/2008/doc/doc080709_10_en.html [hereinafter Major Economies]. 
 16. DANIEL BODANSKY & ELLIOT DIRINGER, TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MULTI-
TRACK CLIMATE FRAMEWORK 3 (2007), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/multi-
track; see David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: 
Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures in ARCHITECTURES FOR 
AGREEMENT 133 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007). 
 17. See generally Joseph Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global 
Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373 (2003); DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES (2004), 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ (follow “more” hyperlink under “Reports”; then 
click on title of article). 
 18. Jutta Brunnée & Kelly Levin, Climate Policy Beyond Kyoto: The Perspective 
of the European Union in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 58, 
62-63 (Steven Bernstein et al. eds., 2008). 
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and regional conditions.  Bodansky and Diringer note that increased 
flexibility is the primary advantage of a multi-track framework since 
states are more likely to participate in cooperative actions that are well 
suited to their domestic economic and political requirements.19  Where 
those requirements are regional in scope because of common 
geographical features, closer economic integration, or shared political 
institutions, there may be advantages to regionally based arrangements.  
When one considers the multi-level aspect of climate-change governance, 
flexibility also provides improved opportunities for actors, such as sub-
national governments and non-state actors, who are not formally 
recognized in international law, to respond to global climate change in 
accordance with their preferences, without necessarily having those 
preferences aggregated and possibly subsumed by national governments.20 
The potential costs of increased flexibility are a loss of broader policy 
coherence and a lack of reciprocity between states.  The latter concern is 
particularly important given the strong incentives for free-riding 
associated with climate-change mitigation.  As a consequence, continued 
coordination of the various tracks in a multi-track framework is 
necessary. The ability to accurately track emissions and require disclosure 
of emissions data is a baseline requirement for continued cooperation, 
particularly because reliable comparison of emissions-reduction 
information enhances the opportunity for linking different tracks.21  
Comparability provides states with assurances that their own sacrifices 
are being reciprocated by other states and a basis for assessing the fairness 
of climate-change burden allocation globally.  Some U.S. climate bills 
have proposed trade restrictions on goods coming from countries that do 
not have “comparable” climate-change regulations.22  The ability to 
 19. BODANSKY & DIRINGER, supra note 16, at 3-5. 
 20. Consider, for example, the differences in policy between the Provinces of 
Alberta and Québec.  Alberta, with a heavy economic reliance on emissions-intensive 
industries, such as oil and gas, does not seek to implement emission reductions in the 
short term; Québec, on the other hand, generates and exports hydro-electric, and is more 
willing to adopt more stringent emissions-reduction targets. See COUNCIL OF THE 
FEDERATION, CLIMATE CHANGE: LEADING PRACTICES BY PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN CANADA 3-6 (2007), available at http://www.councilofthefederation. 
ca/pdfs/CCInventoryAug3_EN.pdf. 
 21. For example, there may be benefits to allowing emissions trading across different 
governance structures.  For a discussion of attempts by New Jersey to participate in the 
EU-ETS, see, for example, Engel, supra note 11, at 68. 
 22. See, e.g., Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 502(f) 
(2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.1766. 
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compare regulatory programs and to demonstrate similar levels of 
burdens on trade-competitive sectors may be necessary to avoid these 
kinds of protectionist measures in climate legislation.  Since cooperative 
arrangements may be developed on multiple levels, coordination 
requires both vertical integration between levels and horizontal 
integration between various tracks. The complexity of integration suggests 
that states should approach the negotiation of multiple climate-change 
arrangements with considerable caution, as the transaction costs and the 
costs of increased fragmentation may outweigh the benefits of flexibility.  
Increased governance arrangements are not an unalloyed good. 
III.  THE EXISTING GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE: CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMMITMENTS AND POLICIES 
A.  North American GHG Emissions 
To understand the existing governance landscape, it is first helpful to 
take stock of the basic GHG-emissions conditions in North America.  
Looking at the statistics in Figure 1 (see below at page 207), the principal 
condition that must be accounted for is the asymmetry in emissions 
between the three North American countries.  On an absolute basis, U.S. 
emissions are much greater than both Canada and Mexico, owing to its 
larger economy; on a per capita basis, Mexico’s emissions are significantly 
less—one-fourth—than those of Canada and the U.S.  This asymmetry 
will likely impact the architecture of any regional climate structure.  For 
example, regional cooperation will need to account for Mexico’s lower per-
capita emissions and its higher emissions-growth rate, possibly through the 
application of differential-reduction requirements.  Relative to absolute 
emissions, it might be expected that market-based structures, such as 
trading systems, will reflect the fact that U.S. emissions will account for 
the majority of the market.  Since the U.S. gains relatively less in terms 
of access to a larger market, it may have less incentive to adjust its 
domestic programs to meet regional requirements.23  The GHG intensity 
numbers in the bottom of Table 1, which indicate the amount of GHGs 
emitted per economic output (GDP), show that Mexico, and to a lesser 
extent, Canada, release more emissions to produce the same amount of  
  
 23. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INTL. L. 1, 
58-61 (2002) (noting that regulatory convergence will often result in adoption of the 
standards of more powerful states). 
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TABLE 1 BASIC GHG STATISTICS FOR NORTH AMERICA 
 Canada U.S. Mexico 
GHG Emissions in 2006 (MtCO2e) 
(excluding Land Use, Land-Use Change, 
and Forestry [LULUCF])24 718 7006 553 (in 2002) 
GHG Emissions in 2006 (MtCO2e) 
(including LULUCF) 760 6001 643 
GHG Emissions in 1990 (MtCO2e) 
(excluding LULUCF)25 592 6084 425 
Change in emissions from 1990-2006 
(excluding LULUCF) 21% 15% 30% (in 2002) 
Contribution to Global GHG Emissions in 
2004 (excluding Land-Use Change and 
Forestry)26  2.1% 22% 1.5% 
GHG emissions per capita in 2000 (tCO2e) 
(excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry)27 22.1 24.5 5.2 
Emissions Intensity in 2006 (tCO2e/millions of 
dollars (GDP-PPP)) (including LULUCF)28 652 464 701 (in 2002) 
 
 
 24. UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do 
(to obtain data select “Canada,” “United States” and “Mexico” under “Select Party;” select 
“All years” under “Select Years;” select “Total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF/ LUCF” 
under “Select Category” and select “Aggregate GHGs” under “Select Gas”) (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009). 
 25. UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do 
(to obtain data select “Canada,” “United States” and “Mexico” under “Select Party;” select 
“All years” under “Select Years;” select “Total GHG emissions including LULUCF/LUCF” 
under “Select Category” and select “Aggregate GHGs” under “Select Gas”) (last visited Oct. 
28, 2009). 
 26. World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool [CAIT], http://cait. 
wri.org/ (register and log into CAIT; then click “CAIT” under “Access CAIT Products;” 
then follow hyperlink to “Yearly Emissions”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
 27. KEVIN BAUMERT ET AL., NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA 
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 22 (2005), available at http://www.wri.org/ 
publication/navigating-the-numbers (follow “full report” hyperlink). 
 28. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Sept. 
2006), http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/WEO/2006/02/DATA/INDEX.ASPX 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (source of GDP figures).  The emissions intensity numbers 
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economic output as the U.S.  This suggests that there may be potential 
for increased emissions efficiency in both Canada and Mexico. 
Broken down by sector (see Figure 2 below at page 207), the GHG 
inventories for Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. look fairly similar, with 
the exception of higher emissions from land use, land-use change, and 
forestry in Canada and Mexico, and higher emissions from waste in 
Mexico.  The GHG emissions by gas type reflect similar emissions patterns.  
Given the broad range of activities that occur within each of these sectors, a 
more exacting analysis is required to assess potential for sectoral 
programs in North America.  Further study should identify, inter alia, 
those sectors that make significant GHG contributions within each state, 
sectors that have sharp emission rate increases, and those sectors where 
GHG intensity levels differ between countries, suggesting opportunities 
for improvement with existing technology.29 
One area where there is a higher degree of difference among Canada, 
Mexico, and the U.S. is vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.  
The differences in vulnerability are affected by both geographic and 
economic factors.30  Quantifying vulnerability to climate change remains 
difficult, but one global study indicated that Canada was the least vulnerable 
of the states and showed that Mexico has markedly higher vulnerability.31  
Another study focusing on Mexican vulnerability indicated that infrastructure, 
human capital, and economic factors were strong determinants of 
vulnerability.32  The differences in vulnerability have implications for 
the relative priorities of mitigation and adaptation, with Mexico needing to 
direct greater resources to improving its resilience towards climate 
change than Canada and the U.S.  Such differences do not undermine 
regional cooperation but are likely to influence its form.  For example, 
Mexico is more likely to want to include technical assistance and 
financing for adaptation measures as part of a broader regional climate 
cooperation initiative.33 
 29. See Daniel Bodansky, International Sectoral Agreements in a Post-2012 Climate 
Framework 9-10 (May 2007) (unpublished working paper), http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
working-papers/sectoral (follow hyperlink “download entire report”).  Bodansky also 
suggests economic and political—”negotiability and participation”—factors.  Id. at 10-11. 
 30. María Eugenia Ibarrarán Viniegra & Salimah Mónica Cossens González, Climate 
Change Research and Policy in Mexico: Implications for North American Security, 
35 POL. & POL’Y 684, 684 (2007); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.  Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 26 
(2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
 31. New Report Assesses Countries’ Climate Change Vulnerability, CSR EUR., Aug. 
12, 2008, http://www.csreurope.org/news.php?type=&action=show_news&news_id=1598. 
 32. Viniegra & González, supra note 30, at 691. 
 33. Mexico’s greater need for adaptation is reflected in their domestic policies 
discussed infra Part 2(c). 
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B. International Commitments and Programs 
Appendix 1 sets out in comparative form a summary of Canada’s, 
Mexico’s, and the U.S.’s respective international commitments and 
participation in international programs relating to climate change.  In 
Appendix 2, we have prepared another chart comparing each national 
government’s domestic climate change policies.  In what follows, we 
draw out the key areas of commonality and difference in climate-change 
policy among these states. 
The starting point for each state is common participation in the 
UNFCCC regime. As a framework treaty, the UNFCCC does not impose 
quantified obligations on the parties; rather, it commits the parties to 
additional cooperative activities in furtherance of the overall objective of 
stabilizing atmospheric GHGs at non-dangerous levels.34  Despite the 
disengagement by the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC has 
been repeatedly affirmed by Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. as the 
appropriate forum for continued global negotiation on climate change.35  
The U.S. has, for example, continued in its financial support for the 
regime itself, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
and through contributions to the Global Environmental Facility.36  The 
current significance of the UNFCCC is the continued acceptance of the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that underlies 
the basic architecture of the UNFCCC.37  In the North American context, 
Canada and the U.S. are identified as Annex I states with primary 
responsibility for addressing climate change.38  Mexico, as a non-Annex 
I party, is obligated to undertake mitigation measures taking into account 
its development goals and national circumstances and to cooperate in 
addressing global climate-change impacts and causes.39 
The need for integration of regional initiatives within a global 
framework will require consistency between the UNFCCC and any 
regional framework.  The “broad but shallow” architecture of the UNFCCC  
 34. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 35. Major Economies, supra note 15, ¶ 1; Summit Leaders Declaration, supra note 
13, ¶¶ 22-23; Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 3. 
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENERGY SECURITY, CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE 34 (2008). 
 37. UNFCCC, supra note 34, at art. 3(1). 
 38. Also, Annex I states hold further responsibilities to assist developing states 
with adaptation measures.  Id. 
 39. Id. arts. 4(1)(b)-(c). 
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does not impose significant constraints, and the language of the treaty 
acknowledges in several provisions the possible role of regional 
cooperation.40  The acceptance by all three North American states of a 
common methodology for calculating national GHG inventories and 
reporting those to the UNFCCC will facilitate integration.  The IPCC 
process also provides a common scientific basis for the development of 
regional policies. The IPCC’s work on climate vulnerability has, for 
example, been undertaken on a regional basis and may provide an 
agreed-upon starting point for regional approaches to adaptation. 
The asymmetrical architecture of the UNFCCC was carried over into 
the Kyoto Protocol, with Canada and the U.S. agreeing to economy-wide 
GHG emission reductions of 6% and 7%, respectively, but not requiring 
reciprocal cuts from developing countries.  The U.S. did not ratify the 
Protocol.  Although Canada is a party to the Protocol (as is Mexico as a 
non-Annex B party), it has acknowledged that it will not meet its Kyoto 
obligations.  It is increasingly clear that Canada is moving away from the 
Kyoto “targets and timetables” model.  Canada’s most recent domestic 
policy approach emphasizes emissions intensity, as opposed to absolute 
reductions, and defines its emissions-reduction goals in terms of a 2006 
baseline, as opposed to a 1990 baseline.  Given the current stance of 
Canada and the evolving U.S. position, it is unclear whether Canada and 
the U.S. will agree to short- to mid-term economy-wide emissions 
reductions.  To date, the three North American states have placed greater 
emphasis on long-term targets.  For example, the Bali Action Plan, 
adopted at the 13th Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 
simply calls for the adoption of a “long-term global goal for emissions 
reduction.”41  A similar emphasis on long-term goals was made in the 
Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security 
and Climate Change, in which Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. 
participated.42  At the 14th Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties, Mexico pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by 50% by 2050 
from a 2002 baseline.43  U.S. President Barack Obama has similarly 
indicated his administration’s intention to see the U.S. reduce its 
emissions by 80% from its 1990 levels by 2050.44  This target has been 
affirmed by the House of Representatives in the American Clean Energy  
 40. Id. arts. 4(1)(b), 6(a), 11(5). 
 41. Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 3. 
 42. Major Economies, supra note 15, ¶ 2. 
 43. Holly, supra note 2. 
 44. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Promoting A Healthy Environment, http://www. 
barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
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and Security Act of 2009.45 Canada, for its part, has indicated its 
intention to reduce its emissions by 60-70% by 2050, using a 2006 
baseline.46 
Both Canada and Mexico have participated in the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol; although, to date, no 
CDM projects have been concluded between Canada and Mexico.47  
Canada has not used the joint-implementation or emissions-trading 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Canada’s current domestic 
climate-change policy allows for the use of credits generated from CDM 
projects by private firms to satisfy those firms’ domestic emission 
reduction obligation.  However, Canada’s continued participation in the 
CDM process is far from certain.  Regardless of the precise scheme, 
through their current participation, Canada and Mexico have developed 
capacity to design and implement creditable projects.  Demonstrable 
governance capacity in relation to marketable emissions credits is 
particularly desirable, as it ensures that credits are not granted for 
unrealized or temporary emissions reductions.  The potential for multiple 
emission-credit markets and the possibility of credits being “double-
counted” again underscores the importance of integrating parallel policy 
frameworks.48 
From a regional perspective, the move away from short-term, 
economy-wide targets at the global level will create policy space for 
bottom-up approaches that focus more on creating the conditions for 
reducing emissions than the top-down approach.49  The most prominent 
existing example of a much looser form of international climate-change 
cooperation is the APP, which includes the U.S. and Canada, as well as 
major Pacific Rim economies.50  The APP is not a formally binding 
treaty but, rather, provides a framework for exchanging information and 
other cooperative activity between states with a primary focus on energy 
 45. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th  Cong.    
§ 311 (2009). 
 46. Turning the Corner: Taking Action to Fight Climate Change (Mar. 2008), http:// 
www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/brochure_eng.html. 
 47. See infra Appendix 1. 
 48. For a discussion of some of the accounting complexities and problems with the 
CDM, see generally Michael Wara & David Victor, A Realistic Policy on International 
Carbon Offsets (Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working 
Paper No. 74, 2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_ final.pdf. 
 49. The distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches is discussed 
in BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at 9-10. 
 50. Charter of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, 
supra note 7.  APP members include: Australia, China, Canada, India, Japan, South 
Korea, and the U.S.  Id. 
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cooperation.51 The APP’s voluntary approach allows for broad 
participation of countries that have traditionally resisted binding 
emissions reductions.52 The cost of securing participation is that 
environmental effectiveness of the APP is likely to be much lower than 
an approach that articulates emissions-reduction commitments.53 The 
APP has no quantified environmental outcomes and no price-driven 
incentives for technological innovation. The structure of the APP is 
similarly diffuse, consisting principally of eight sectoral task forces,54 
which include both public and private representation.  The agenda for 
each task force is defined broadly, leaving considerable room for task 
force members to define their respective work plans. To date, the 
outcomes have been non-regulatory, focusing instead on developing 
industry best environmental practices and moving towards reducing 
barriers to trade for environmental goods and services.55 
In addition to the APP, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. participate in a 
variety of climate-oriented networks.56  Many of these have focused on 
the development and implementation of new technologies, particularly 
in the energy sector.  None of these organizations is intended to develop 
binding rules; although, like the APP, some have produced guidelines 
and seek to identify best practices.  These groups often constitute both 
public and private sector representatives, as well as civil society 
organizations.  Participation in climate-oriented networks includes both 
developed and developing states, but there are few formal avenues for 
technology transfer or direct-project financing in developing states.  
 51. The APP is best understood as a form of trans-governmental networked 
governance.  For a discussion of trans-governmental networks, see generally Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. OF 
L. & SOC. SCI. 211 (2006). 
 52. Only Japan and Canada have emissions-reduction obligations under Kyoto. 
 53. The relationship between participation and strictness of rules is considered in 
George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News and 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996). 
 54. The sectoral task forces include: Aluminum, Buildings and Appliances, Cement, 
Cleaner Fossil Energy, Coal Mining, Power Generation and Transmission, Renewable 
Energy & Distributed Generation, and Steel.  APP Public-Private Sector Task Forces, 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/task_forces.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 
2009). 
 55. For example, appliance-testing harmonization, enhancing production processes, 
developing sector-related benchmark and performance assessments, identifying 
current reclamation activities in partner countries, and enhancing synergy among task 
force objectives.  See id. 
 56. See infra Appendix 1 for list and description. 
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While all of these initiatives address aspects of the climate-change issue, 
there is very little evidence that states are concerned with integrating 
these various initiatives. Indeed, the informal and decentralized structure 
of this form of governance makes integration more difficult. 
In North America, the structure of regional cooperative efforts is 
similarly diffuse. The most institutionalized set of commitments 
regarding the environment is found in the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the so-called NAFTA 
environmental side agreement.57 The NAAEC creates the North American 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which is governed 
by a Council consisting of the environment minister from each state.58  It 
also has a permanent secretariat and opportunities for civic engagement.59 
Despite having a broad mandate to improve environmental quality,60 the 
Council has only been engaged in climate-change policy in limited 
ways.61  In 1995, the Council adopted a Statement of Intent to Cooperate 
on Climate Change and Joint Implementation, which set out a number of 
areas of cooperation for the states to pursue, including joint pursuit of 
GHG-mitigation technologies, conservation and enhancement of carbon 
sinks, improving GHG-emission inventory-and-forecasting methodologies, 
and climate-change research.62 Significantly, the Statement of Intent 
specifically references the UNFCCC, including the common but 
differentiated responsibilities of the parties and the reference to “joint 
implementation.”63  The Statement of Intent appears only to have resulted in 
a small number of joint projects.64 There has been no specific mention of 
climate change in the Council Ministerial Statements or Communiqués 
since an indication in 1998 that the Parties would work together under 
the framework of the Kyoto Protocol to develop North American 
opportunities for the CDM, which did not happen.  More recent 
 57. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., done Sept. 9-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
 58. Id. at arts. 8-9. 
 59. The structure of the CEC includes the Joint Public Advisory Committee, Id. at 
art. 16, and allows for citizen-initiated reviews of enforcement failures. 
 60. See generally NAAEC, supra note 57. 
 61. See generally Michele Betsill, Regional Governance of Global Climate Change: 
The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
POL. 2 (2007).  Among the types of involvement are publication of educational materials 
on climate change and awarding of modest grants to projects aimed at emissions 
reductions. 
 62. Commission for Environmental Cooperation [CEC], Statement of Intent to 
Cooperate on Climate Change and Joint Implementation, at § III, Council Res. No. 95-6 
(Oct. 13, 1995), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=149& 
varlan=english. 
 63. See generally id. 
 64. Early projects supported by the CEC under this mandate included reforestation 
and renewable-energy initiatives in Mexico, in partnership with the U.S. private sector. 
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communiqués focus on air pollution, renewable energy, green building, 
and chemical pollutants; while these issues bear on climate change, they 
do not directly implement climate-change policy.65 
Michelle Betsill concludes that the “potential benefits of situating a 
North America climate governance system in the CEC are limited.”66  In 
essence, Betsill argues that the linkages between climate change and 
environmental issues in which the CEC has traditionally been involved, 
such as air quality, are unlikely to result in a robust climate-change 
regime. Institutionally, the CEC has been hampered by its intergovernmental 
structure, which requires consensus among the three participants 
to move any issue forward.67 The CEC’s inactivity on climate 
change reflects the lack of willingness of the Parties to engage one 
another on climate-change issues.  This situation may improve given the 
greater recognition by the Parties that aggressive GHG mitigation is 
required.  The other potential handicap that the CEC labors under is that 
its governance structure feeds solely into environment ministries, but 
solutions will require involvement from other ministries, particularly in 
the energy and natural resources area. 
The other potential vehicle for regional climate-change cooperation is 
the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP).68  The 
SPP is a form of trans-governmental networked governance.69  The SPP 
has no foundational treaty, nor does it have any permanent institutions.  
Instead, the SPP is an agenda of bilateral and trilateral regulatory initiatives 
aimed at promoting regional security and regional prosperity.70  The 
work program is undertaken by a series of working groups established 
under the SPP, including an environmental working group and an energy 
 65. For example, Council Resolution No. 01-05 addresses the development of 
common methodologies for emissions inventories and forecasts with passing reference to 
the UNFCCC.  CEC, Promoting Comparability of Air Emissions Inventories, at Nos. 1, 
4, Council Res. No. 01-05 (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_ 
docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=522&varlan=english. 
 66. Betsill, supra note 61, at 21. 
 67. NAAEC, supra note 57, at art. 9(6). 
 68. As of August 2009, the SPP is no longer an active initiative.  See http://www. 
spp.org. 
 69. Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially) 
Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 
America, 8 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 479, 492 (2008). 
 70. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America [SPP], Prosperity Agenda, 
http://www.spp.gov/prosperity_agenda/index.asp?dName=prosperity_agenda (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009); SPP, Security Agenda, http://www.spp.gov/security_agenda/index.asp? 
dName=security_agenda (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
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working group.  The working groups, consistent with the SPP’s trans-
governmental form, are made up of government officials. Climate-
change law and policy in the SPP has been noticeable only in its absence.71  
Some of the agenda items focus on clean-energy and energy-efficiency 
measures,72 but there has been no overall intention to use the SPP to 
address climate change in a comprehensive manner.  However, after the 
most recent Leaders Meeting, the joint statement included the following 
reference to climate change: 
We reiterate our support for the Bali Action Plan and stress the urgency of 
reaching agreement to ensure the full, effective and sustained implementation of 
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change now, up to and beyond 
2012. We believe that the Major Economies Leaders Meeting should make a 
contribution to that outcome. All should redouble efforts to address climate change 
and to establish nationally appropriate programs and goals to be reflected in binding 
international commitments based on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, to contribute to ensuring global greenhouse 
gas emission reductions, adaptation measures, energy security, and sustainable 
development. We are determined to work together to further explore regional 
cooperation in climate change efforts, including, but not limited to, advancing 
innovative and suitable clean energy technologies, building the capacity to adopt 
and deploy them and developing appropriate financial and technical instruments. We 
reaffirm our shared conviction that increased trade in environmental goods, 
services, and technologies can have a positive impact on global climate change 
efforts and encourage the removal of barriers to such trade.73 
This statement is of note for several reasons.  First, it reiterates the 
commitment of the leaders to address climate change through 
international negotiation in accordance with the underlying principles of 
the UNFCCC, including the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. Second, it acknowledges the potential for regional 
cooperation to address climate change. Third, it indicates that such 
cooperative efforts may focus on promoting technological innovation 
and capacity-building. Finally, the Joint Statement also includes a 
reference to “energy security,” a matter of increasing domestic 
 71. For example, an influential background report prepared by the Council on 
Foreign Relations does discuss climate change as part of a broader North American 
resource strategy.  See JOHN P. MANLEY ET AL., BUILDING A NORTH AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 15-18 (2005), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8102/building_a_ 
north_american_community.html. 
 72. See SPP, The Energy Working Group, http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-
psp.nsf/eng/00045.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); see also Agreement Among the 
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the U.S. of America for the Cooperation in Energy Science and 
Technology, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 3, July 23, 2007, http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp- 
psp.nsf/vwapj/energy.pdf/$file/energy.pdf. 
 73. Prime Minister of Canada, Joint Statement by President Bush, President Calderon, 
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importance in the U.S.  The deliberate inclusion of energy security (and 
the specific reference to the Major Economies Leaders Meeting), within 
a statement on climate policy, ties the regional process to the broader 
issue of energy security and to the approach adopted at the Major 
Economies Leaders Meeting.74  This approach is also consistent with 
that advocated by an independent task force on North American 
integration, which ties climate change to a regional resource strategy.75 
Finally, the U.S. and Mexico have developed a number of bilateral 
climate-change projects under the auspices of the USAID Global 
Climate Change Program.  The funding is largely project based and has 
focused on land-use improvements and clean-energy production.76  
Canada and Mexico also signed a Joint Statement on Climate Change 
Cooperation at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Montreal on December 8, 2005.77  In February 2009, Canada and the 
U.S. agreed to a “Clean Energy Dialogue,” which promotes cooperation 
in the research and development of clean-energy technologies.78 
C.   Domestic Policies79 
Appendix II summarizes the prevailing domestic policies of the 
federal governments in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.  In each of these 
countries, sub-national governments have important constitutional 
controls over the environment and natural resources.  Consequently, sub-
national governments are increasingly becoming an important source of 
domestic climate change policy.  The respective roles of federal and sub-
national governments continue to evolve, but there is increasing evidence 
 74. Cf. Bodansky, supra note 12, at 64. 
 75. JOHN P. MANLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 18 (“A North American energy and 
emissions regime could offer a regional alternative to Kyoto that includes all three 
countries.”). 
 76. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], USAID’S GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate/docs/ 
brochures/gcc.pdf. 
 77. News Release, Env’t Can., Can.-Mex. Sign Joint Agreement on Climate Change 
Cooperation During the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Can. (Dec. 8, 
2005), available at. http://www.ec.gc.ca/media_archive/press/2005/051208-4_n_e.htm. 
 78. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama and 
Prime Minister Harper Vow Joint Effort on N. Am. Econ. Recovery (Feb. 19, 2009), 
available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2433. 
 79. The discussion of Canadian domestic policy in this section draws from Neil 
Craik, Segnali contraddittori: evoluzione della politica climatica canadese, 3-4 RIVISTA 
GIURIDICA DELL’AMBIENTE 695 (2008) (Italy). 
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that sub-national governments are not willing to leave transnational 
cooperation in the hands of their respective federal governments and are 
entering into trans-boundary cooperative arrangements with one another. 
As Table 1 indicates, neither Canada nor the U.S. has come close to 
achieving its Kyoto commitments.  Indeed, emissions have risen steadily 
since the 1990 baseline.  A less ambitious approach is currently taken in 
the domestic climate change policies of both states.  For its part, Canada 
has indicated a GHG emission reduction target of 20% from its 2006 
emission levels by the year 2020.  This amounts to projected emissions 
of 600 Mt in 2020—an amount that is still higher than Canada’s 1990 
emission levels.  In the longer term, Canada has indicated a willingness 
to reduce its GHG emissions by 60% to 70% by 2050 based on a 2006 
baseline.80  The only quantified emission target the U.S. government has 
officially adopted is an 18% reduction in GHG intensity levels from 
2002 levels by 2012.  However, the Obama administration has indicated 
a commitment returning to 1990 levels by 2020, in addition to its 80% 
reduction by 2050.81  Mexico has not adopted legislated reduction targets 
as such, but it has indicated that it has the potential to reduce its 
emissions by more than 140 Mt by 2014.82  As noted, Mexico has also 
indicated its willingness to reduce its emission by 50% by 2050, but 
Mexico is careful to qualify its pledge by indicating that its success in 
achieving these reductions is conditional upon receiving financial and 
technical assistance.83 
The emission-reduction targets announced are not strongly science-
driven in the sense that they were arrived at by first determining the 
reductions that need to be achieved to stabilize GHGs at safe levels.  
There is growing scientific consensus that in order to keep global 
temperature rises from exceeding 2ºC from pre-industrialization levels, 
atmospheric levels of GHGs need to be limited to between 450 and 550 
ppm CO2e, which in turn would require global emission reductions of 
50% of 1990 levels by 2050.84  The EU has taken note of the scientific 
 80. This is equivalent to a 40%-52% reduction from 1990 baseline levels. 
 81. This target is affirmed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
S. 311, supra note 1.  
 82. The calculation of a 140 Mt emissions reduction was determined by adding the 
estimated emissions reduction, as determined by the Mexican government, for 
each policy goal included in Mexico.  See INTERSECRETARIAL COMM’N ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, NATIONAL STRATEGY ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 7 
(2007) [hereinafter MEXICO NSCC]. 
 83. Holly, supra note 2. 
 84. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius: The Way Ahead for 2020 and 
Beyond, at 3, COM (2007) 2 final (Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Communication from the 
Commission]; see IPCC, supra note 30, at 68. 
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evidence and has specifically linked its reduction targets to achieving the 
long-term goal of GHG stabilization, with specific reference to limiting 
climate change to a 2ºC rise.85  Mexico is the only North American state 
that appears ready to accept a quantified long-term goal “of an indicative 
non-binding nature” expressed in terms of GHG concentration levels at 
550 ppm CO2e.86 
The clearest example of the priority given to economic growth in 
North American climate policy is the use of intensity-based targets by 
both Canada and the U.S.  The Canadian policy has identified sixteen 
sectors that must reduce their emissions intensity by 18% (from a 2006 
baseline) by 2010 and by 2% per year thereafter until 2020, at which 
time the government has indicated its willingness to move to fixed 
emission limits.87  The difficulty is that predictions about absolute future 
emission levels are dependent upon productivity levels, and absolute 
levels may still increase if there is strong growth. 
Reductions in carbon intensity will be attractive in sectors where 
intensity levels are high and there exist technological solutions for 
reducing GHG emissions—for example, where old stock needs to be 
replaced.  However, in order to make significant emission cuts, 
considerable investment will need to be made in research and 
development of new technologies, particularly in the energy sector.88  
The Canadian reduction targets are based heavily on the development of 
carbon-capture and storage technology (CCS), which is highly 
compatible with fossil fuel extraction and production, key sectors in the 
Canadian economy.  CCS allows for the continuing use of coal-fired 
electrical-generating plants, a predominant form of electrical production 
in the U.S.  In order to provide the needed funding for technological 
innovation, the Canadian policy foresees the creation of a technology 
fund in which firms with reduction requirements can make contributions 
in exchange for credits.  The contribution amount starts out very high, 
 85. Communication from the Commission, supra note 84. 
 86. MEXICO NSCC, supra note 82, at 14.  However, the Obama/Biden campaign 
materials indicate support for measures to reduce carbon “by the amount scientists say is 
necessary . . . .” Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America, http://www. 
barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 87. MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRIAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, at iii (2008), available at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/pdf/COM-541_Framework.pdf. 
 88. Scott Barrett, A Proposal for a New Climate Change Treaty System, in A 
GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA, supra note 10, at 315. 
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allowing for firms to meet 70% of their target through contribution 
credits in 2010, but falls rapidly to 0% by 2018.89  The contribution rate 
has been set at $15/tonne CO2e and will rise with growth in GDP but 
does not appear to be tied to the market price of carbon emission credit 
units.  The framework also contemplates the generation of credits 
through offsets, early action, and the use of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The credits generated will be available for domestic 
inter-firm trading.90 
Prior to the Obama administration, the U.S. federal climate change 
policies similarly relied on the development and deployment of new 
technologies, yet funding for research and development had not been 
tied to emissions, nor were there opportunities for firms to receive 
credits for research and development activities.  Instead, the U.S. relied 
on voluntary programs of emission reduction and tax incentives to 
promote innovation.91  The reliance on voluntary measures inhibits the 
development of a carbon market since the price of carbon-emission 
credit-reduction units will be affected by the demand for reduction 
created by binding obligations.  President Obama has indicated that his 
administration will implement a national cap-and-trade program.92  The 
structure of such a scheme has been laid out in several bills before 
Congress, most notably in the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act.93 There is a private carbon exchange in Chicago that relies on 
voluntary but legally enforceable emission reduction commitments.94  
There is also a carbon exchange operating in Montreal that will trade 
credits generated under the Canadian regulatory framework.95  Mexico 
has indicated a desire to develop price signals for carbon use through the 
gradual development of an emission trading system.96 
A fair amount of overlap exists among all three countries in the areas 
identified for emission reductions.  All three countries place some 
emphasis on the further development of renewable energy supplies and 
the increased use of combined heat and power plants.  All three 
 89. There are, however, opportunities for more generous credit allowances—up to 
100% of a firm’s reduction obligation to 2018—for “pre-certified” investments in CCS. 
 90. See MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 87. 
 91. Hunter, supra note 10, at 89-90. 
 92. Organizing for America: New Energy For America, http://my.barackobama. 
com/page/content/newenergy_more#emissions (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 93. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11th Cong. 
§ 311 (2009). 
 94. Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009). 
 95. Montreal Climate Exchange, Canadian Carbon Market, http://www.mcex.ca/ 
aboutGhg_canCarbonMarket_en (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 96. Holly, supra note 2. 
216 
 
CRAIK-DIMENTO[1] (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  12:39 PM 
[VOL. 1:  195, 2009]  Climate Law and Policy in North America 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
countries also address improving energy efficiency and fuel efficiency 
for vehicles, but, again, the approach is to promote improvements 
largely through voluntary policies, not regulation.  The Mexican plan 
emphasizes land-use issues, which receive little attention in Canadian 
and U.S. policies.  Similarly, adaptation is largely ignored in Canada and 
the U.S., but forms an important part of the Mexican policy strategy. 
In the U.S., the absence of a strong federal strategy to address climate 
change has led to sub-national activity, where there has been a greater 
willingness to accept binding GHG emission reductions.  Further 
programs, such as renewable portfolio standards, state based mandatory 
fuel efficiency requirements, and intra-state emission trading programs, 
have accompanied these reduction commitments.97  In Canada, every 
province has climate change policies, all of which include specific 
GHG-reduction targets, most of which are more ambitious than those 
announced by the federal government.98  However, Canadian provinces 
are only now moving to implement their GHG policies into law and have 
less well-developed mechanisms than those of their sub-national 
counterparts in the U.S.99  There remain significant differences between 
sub-national jurisdictions in North America, with oil- and gas-producing 
jurisdictions, such as Alberta, being viewed as policy laggards, compared to 
leaders such as California, New York, and British Columbia.  Many 
North American cities also have GHG-emission-reduction targets and 
accompanying programs.100  Municipal level networks not only provide 
opportunities for cities to exchange information but also serve as forums 
for cities to make emission-reduction pledges and monitor as well as 
verify emissions.101 
 97. Thirty U.S. states have climate action plans.  For a description of each, see The 
Center for Climate Strategies, U.S. Climate Policy Action, http://www.climatestrategies.us 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 98. See generally MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: 
DETAILED EMISSIONS AND ECONOMIC MODELING, at annex 3 (2008), http://www.ec. 
gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/571/Annex3_eng.htm; see also COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION, 
CLIMATE CHANGE: LEADING PRACTICES BY PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN CANADA (2007), available at http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/CCInventory 
Aug3_EN.pdf. 
 99. Rabe, supra note 5, at 424; see generally Carbon Tax Act, 2008 S.B.C., ch. 40 (Can.). 
 100. City initiatives include the Climate Protection Agreement, U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, Climate Protection Agreement, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009) and the C40, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, 
http://www.c40cities.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 101. For example, under the Cities for Climate Protection Program, which includes 
166 cities from Canada, 466 from the U.S., and 4 from Mexico, participating cities make 
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One of the most significant developments at the sub-national level is 
the growth of sub-regional governance structures, such as the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI).  Not only are sub-regional initiatives identifying targets and 
providing forums for voluntary coordination, but they are also creating 
more institutionalized governance structures, such as cap-and-trade 
programs.102  Sub-regional initiatives are now expanding transnationally 
and are actively exploring opportunities to integrate their own activities 
with other groups, including linking trading programs. The WCI 
framework includes participants and observers from Canada and 
Mexico, and the Draft design of the Regional Cap-and-Trade Program 
specifically allows for offset programs located in Canada, the U.S., or 
Mexico to be certified for use within WCI jurisdictions.  One challenge 
to the continued expansion of these sub-regional initiatives is the 
respective constitutional constraints placed on sub-state governments to 
engage in foreign relations and to build sub-regional institutions.103 
IV.  PROSPECTS FOR NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL COOPERATION 
A.  Why Regionalism? 
Climate change is a global problem.  North American states cannot, 
without the cooperation of other major GHG emitter states, solve it.  
North American emissions make up approximately 23% of the global 
total emissions, with that relative share decreasing as developing states 
with higher rates of emissions growth increase their contributions to 
global totals.104  Thus, any GHG-mitigation measures undertaken on a 
regional basis will be insufficient.  In light of the global nature of the 
climate-change problem, why might regional solutions be attractive? 
First, there exist some associated problems arising from climate 
change that have regional level consequences.  There will, for example, 
reduction pledges, develop a local plan to achieve those targets, and monitor the results.  
See ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, Cities for Climate Protection, http://www. 
iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 102. See, e.g., WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2008), http://www.westernclimateinitiative. 
org/component/remository/func-startdown/14. 
 103. See generally Douglas Kysar & Bernadette Meyer, Like a Nation State, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008) (discussing constitutional challenges to state-based climate 
policies in the U.S.); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, 
and the Constitution, 24 ENVTL. F. 4 (2008). 
 104. See supra Table 1.  For a discussion of GHG emission trends, see generally 
KEVIN BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: 
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be ecosystem impacts that transcend national boundaries.  In the North 
American context, shared freshwater resources, including ground water 
resources, are predicted to become further stressed by climate change, 
requiring heightened trans-boundary management.105  Climate change 
may also impact the ranges of species within a region, leading to 
conservation concerns and increased opportunities for invasive species 
proliferation.106  In these areas, North American countries are already 
cooperating on a bi-lateral and tri-lateral basis through institutions such 
as the International Joint Commission, the International and Boundary 
Water Commission, and the North American Committee for Wildlife 
and Ecosystem Conservation and Management.  There is increasing 
scientific evidence that addressing air quality issues alongside climate 
considerations would be beneficial.107  For example, some short-lived air 
pollutants, such as ozone and black carbon (soot), impact climate 
change.  In the U.S., there is increasing pressure on the government to 
include carbon dioxide as a regulated substance under the Clean Act Air, 
particularly in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.108  The CEC has developed expertise in tracking 
air pollutants on a regional basis, which already links carbon dioxide 
regulation with broader air quality concerns.109  In addition, air quality is 
also addressed bi-laterally through the Canada- U.S. Air Quality 
Agreement.110  Betsill notes, with specific reference to climate change 
and air quality issues, that one of the advantages of regional governance 
is that it provides opportunities for issue linkages, which in turn may 
 105. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 619 (2008). 
 106. Id.; see Thomas Homer-Dixon, Positive Feedbacks, Dynamic Ice Sheets, and 
the Recarbonization of the Global Fuel Supply: The New Sense of Urgency About Global 
Warming, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 37, 44-45 (Steven 
Bernstein et al. eds., 2008). 
 107. See generally D. Shindell et al., Climate Forcing and Air Quality Change Due 
to Regional Emissions Reductions by Economic Sector, 8 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & 
PHYSICS 7101 (2008), available at www.atmos-chem-phys.net/8/7101/2008. 
 108. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding that the EPA 
does have the authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act). 
 109. CEC, supra note 65; see Betsill, supra note 61. 
 110. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government 
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allow for policy issues to gain stronger traction where they are bundled 
with issues of higher salience.111 
Second, many of the economic impacts from climate change may also 
be regional in scope.  For example, the economic losses associated with 
climate-change impacts in Mexico may place additional labor migration 
pressures on the U.S.112  Consequently, the U.S. may benefit more by 
focusing its adaptation efforts on a regional basis, rather than on a global 
basis.  Also, because of considerable economic interdependence, 
economic losses in one part of North America may have a stronger 
potential to impact other parts of the region.  Thus, while Canada may 
have low vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change, it 
nevertheless has a strong interest in ensuring that its economic partners’ 
losses from climate change are minimized. 
The high degree of economic integration further militates in favor of 
regional solutions.  In sectors, such as energy and transportation, where 
compliance with climate-change policies is likely to be significant, there 
will be pressure for states to maintain sectoral competitiveness.113  
Similarly, in the event of high degrees of asymmetry in climate-change 
commitments, there may be heightened concerns that firms will locate in 
jurisdictions with less onerous requirements, referred to as “environmental 
leakage.”114  Leakage is more likely to occur in areas where capital is 
mobile and market access is unaffected by relocation to areas with lower 
regulatory burdens.  These conditions favor regional cooperation in 
North America given the open market access and strong investor 
protection measures available under NAFTA.  There exists a need to 
study on a sectoral basis whether the gains from shifting GHG-intensive 
activity to areas with less onerous GHG regulation are sufficient to incur 
the attendant costs.  Competitiveness concerns have influenced U.S. 
decisions to seek international agreements on other environmental 
issues.  In particular, Beth DeSombre has shown that in a number of 
instances where the U.S. has been willing to act unilaterally on an 
 111. Betsill, supra note 61, at 14.  But note that Betsill remains skeptical of the 
ability of the CEC to capitalize on these linkages, concluding that “synergies between air 
quality policies and climate mitigation policies are possible but not assured.”  Id. at 20. 
 112. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 56 (2007), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm; see also Nils 
Petter Gleditsch et al., Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link 1, 6 (May 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/ 
cwc_working_paper_climate_change.pdf. 
 113. See generally Robert Page, Kyoto and Emissions Trading: Challenges for the 
NAFTA Family, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55, 56 (2002). 
 114. See discussion of “leakage” in SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT 
383 (2003).  The extent of economic leakage requires careful empirical analysis, as firm 
location is determined by a variety of factors unrelated to the extent of regulatory burden. 
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environmental issue, affected industry groups seek internalization of that 
issue in order to maintain competitive parity.115 
A further advantage to regional climate-change cooperation is that it is 
likely to provide greater opportunities for cost-effective reductions.  The 
most prominent examples of this are both the use of emissions trading 
and joint implementation, which are means to increase cost effectiveness 
on a regional (Europe) and sub-regional (RGGI and WCI) basis.  While 
there exists at present no national emissions-trading systems, both the 
U.S. and Canada are preparing to launch national cap-and-trade systems.  
The sub-regional systems are anticipated to operate on a transnational 
basis.  Canadian policies anticipate the creation of tradable credits, as 
does the Mexican policy.  Both Canada and Mexico have had experience 
with using international credits under the CDM, and Canada continues to 
rely on CDM-type credits into the future.  In the event that Canada does 
not agree to continue within the Kyoto framework, there will be a 
demand for an alternative mechanism to generate credits. 
A necessary condition for establishing market mechanisms to trade 
emission credits is a robust system of GHG emission-tracking in order to 
ensure that credits granted are genuine reductions and permanent in 
nature.  Strong emissions inventory capacity will also facilitate the integration 
of multiple crediting systems, which permits different regional actors to 
pursue a variety of approaches while allowing flexibility through trading.  
As an example, the WCI draft trading regime anticipates developing 
rules for the incorporation of British Columbia’s carbon tax into its 
system of credits.116  In this regard, North America is well positioned as 
a region because each country has well-developed capacities in emission 
calculation and inventory tracking.  The GHG inventories are all based 
on UNFCCC methodologies and should be compatible. 
Integrated carbon markets on a regional scale may offer less flexibility 
than global markets.  However, regional transaction costs can make the 
development of smaller markets, which may be linked to other markets 
in the future, a preferable strategy.  There is some evidence that this is in 
fact the preferred direction of North American states.  Mexico’s 
description of the development of its domestic carbon market indicates a 
progressive movement from a price-controlled system to one that is 
 115. ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 42, 43 (2000). 
 116. Id. 
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eventually integrated with international markets.  Canada also appears 
set to use centrally controlled carbon prices (to determine a firm’s 
contribution rate to the technology fund, as an alternative to mandated 
reductions) with future integration.  The Canadian offset system does not 
now allow for the use of offsets or allowances from projects outside 
Canada,117 but cooperative efforts could provide opportunities for 
regional offsets.  For example, the proposed structure of the WCI cap-
and-trade program allows for up to 49% (per regulated entity) of a 
reduction obligation to be satisfied by offsets or allowances from other 
systems, so long as those projects are subject to “comparably rigorous 
oversight,”118 possibly a task that can be designated to an existing 
institution.  In response to the announcement by the U.S. administration 
that the U.S. would seek to implement a national cap-and-trade program, 
Canada has actively sought to negotiate a continental emission trading 
agreement with the U.S. and Mexico.119 
A final factor that militates in favor of regional climate-change 
cooperation is the presence of pre-existing governance institutions, both 
formal and informal.  Regional environmental governance in North 
America is weak.  There are few regional environmental institutions, and 
those that exist do not operate autonomously from national governments.  
The most prominent among these is the CEC.  However, the CEC at this 
time is not well suited as a forum for climate governance because the 
Council is made up exclusively of environment ministers.  In each of the 
three North American states, climate-change policy is not the exclusive 
responsibility of environment ministries, and there has been a considerable 
amount of inter-ministry competition over climate change.120  It is 
unlikely that national governments will confer significant climate-
change policy functions upon the CEC.121  However, the CEC may play 
a more invigorated role in coordinating research activity, particularly in 
 117. MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: CANADA’S OFFSET 
SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 13 (2008), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/ 
collection_2009/ec/En84-42-4-2008E.pdf. 
 118. See WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 102, at 10-11. 
 119. MICHAËLLE JEAN, PROTECTING CANADA’S FUTURE: SPEECH FROM THE THRONE 
11 (2008), available at http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sftddt-e.pdf; see Alexander 
Panetta & Steve Rennie, Canada to Seek Climate Deal with Obama, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Nov. 5, 2008. 
 120. Simone Pulver, Climate Politics in Mexico in a North American Perspective, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS IN NORTH AMERICA: THE STATE OF PLAY 49, 58 (Henrik 
Selen & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 2006) available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/ 
pubs/CI_OccPaper_ClimateChange3.pdf; Stephen Bernstein, International Institutions and 
the Framing of Domestic Policies: The Kyoto Protocol and Canada’s Response to 
Climate Change, 35 POL’Y SCI. 203, 215 (2002). 
 121. For a discussion of the CEC as a forum for emissions trading, see generally 
Betsill, supra note 61. 
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areas where it already has developed expertise, such as in environmental 
impacts from trade.122 In many ways, the CEC is an anomalous 
institution in North America, where the preference has been to resolve 
environmental concerns bi-laterally and without the creation of 
institutions.  In those instances where institutions have been created, 
such as the International Joint Commission, a preference remains not to 
delegate policy making and dispute resolution functions to international 
bodies.123 
The SPP provides an alternative forum and model for regional 
cooperation; one that is more decentralized and sectorally driven.  If the 
Joint Leaders statement from New Orleans (quoted above) is an 
indication of the kind of cooperative measures that might be undertaken 
through the SPP, then one would expect cooperative efforts to be 
discrete and conducted with little attention to broader integration.  For 
example, the Energy Working Group’s agenda includes matters relating 
to climate change, such as enhanced research and development cooperation 
on clean technologies and energy efficiency. Yet, it also includes 
measures to increase oil sands production (presumably as a matter of 
energy security).124  To date, the outcomes of the SPP process relating to 
clean energy have been modest; however, in 2007, the three 
governments did enter into an agreement on clean energy research and 
development cooperation.125 
The forms of cooperation under the SPP to date suggest that it may be 
ill suited as a governance structure for comprehensive climate change 
 122. For example, under Article 13 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may initiate 
reports on a broad range of environmental matters.  NAAEC, supra note 57, at art. 13.  
To date, the Secretariat has produced reports on matters relevant to climate policy such 
as continental electricity cooperation and green building standards.  CEC SECRETARIAT, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES  AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE EVOLVING NORTH AMERICAN 
ELECTRICITY MARKET (2002), available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/index_ 
programs.cfm?programId=5&varlan=english; CEC SECRETARIAT, GREEN BUILDING IN 
NORTH AMERICA, available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/index_programs.cfm? 
programId=5&varlan=english. 
 123. See generally Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate 
of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 273 (1998). 
 124. See generally SPP, THE OIL SANDS WORKSHOP SPP REPORT (2006), available at 
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/oilgas_generalpubs/oilsands_spp_report
_ 2.pdf. 
 125. Agreement Among the Government of Canada, the Government of the United 
Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in 
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regulation.  Debora VanNijnatten argues that the environmental objectives 
of the SPP are insufficiently linked with the broader economic agenda of 
the SPP, creating barriers to comprehensive and sustainable decision-
making.126 The economic bias of the SPP is also evidenced in the 
privileged position that business and industry leaders are given within 
the broader SPP structure through the North American Competitiveness 
Council, which provides guidance directly to the ministers responsible 
for the SPP agenda.  There is no comparable avenue of consultation for 
civil society groups.127 The result is that the SPP suffers from a 
considerable legitimacy deficit.  A potential structural advantage of the 
SPP is that the process has been subject to strong executive oversight, 
which allows for regional priorities to be set and for central governments 
to consider the broader implications of sectoral initiatives.  It also 
provides opportunities for central governments to better integrate climate 
policies across different sectors. 
At more informal levels, strong institutional connections exist among 
the three American states addressing climate change.  As indicated in 
Table 1, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. participate in a significant number of 
common initiatives internationally, many of which are structured as 
loose networks set up for the purpose of exchanging information.  There 
are increasing examples of sub-national environmental cooperation, such 
as the New England Governors—Eastern Canadian Premiers, which 
established a climate change action plan in 2001, the Midwestern 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, established in 2007, and 
the WCI, which expanded to include Canadian provinces.  Outside the 
climate change area, there are examples of multi-level governance 
structures.  For example, the Canada U.S. Air Quality Committee, a bi-
lateral committee created to implement the Canada-U.S. Air Quality 
Agreement, comprises both federal officials and officials from several 
border states and provinces.128  On the U.S.–Mexico border, there has 
been a long history of environmental cooperation through the 1983 La 
Paz Agreement,129 the Border Environment Cooperation Commission,130 
 126. Debora VanNijnatten, The Security and Prosperity Agreement as an Indicator 
Species for the Emerging North American Environmental Regime, 35 POL. & POL’Y 664, 
670-73 (2007). 
 127. Craik & DiMento, supra note 69, at 493-94. 
 128. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government 
of Canada on Air Quality, supra note 100, at art. VIII. 
 129. Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border 
Area, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1025. 
 130. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission and a North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 16, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1545; see Welcome: Border Environment Cooperation Commission, http://www.cocef. 
org/ingles.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
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and joint projects between federal environmental regulators, such as 
Border 2012.131  The result is a dense web of overlapping policy initiatives 
and a growing network of officials familiar with climate change initiatives 
and broader sustainability agendas within North America.  This, in turn, 
improves opportunities for policy diffusion and allows bureaucrats to 
exercise influence over the broader policy agenda by linking initiatives.132  
Many of these initiatives have a regional or sub-regional orientation, so 
there is likely to be a path dependant bias in favor of continuing these 
arrangements on the same scale, with opportunities for incremental 
enlargement.  This appears to be the trajectory of the sub-regional climate 
change initiatives. 
Regional cooperation allows for like-minded states to maximize their 
depth of cooperation, where agreement cannot be met on a global level.  
Europe, for example, has adopted regional commitments to reduce GHG 
emissions in the absence of, but clearly in the hope of affecting, broader 
global commitments on deeper, economy-wide reductions.  A similar 
dynamic is evident in the sub-regional cooperation in the U.S., where 
some states have developed cooperative institutions in the absence of 
agreement at the national level.  In North America, the most striking 
commonality, at least between Canada and the U.S., is the move away 
from the short-term, fixed, economy-wide emission reduction commitments 
found in the Kyoto Protocol, while still accepting long-term targets and 
the broader global objectives and principles found in the UNFCCC.  The 
levels of commitment that Canada and the U.S. are prepared to agree to, 
particularly in the short and medium term, are similar, in that both 
countries prefer shallow reduction commitments deepening over time.  
There is a strong premium on economic certainty in both countries, as 
demonstrated by the preference for intensity-based targets.  Mexico 
maintains a commitment to the principle of differentiated responsibilities, 
but nevertheless appears to be prepared to identify emission reduction 
targets.  Canada and the U.S. have repeatedly affirmed their own 
commitment to this principle, but have insisted that major developing 
economies take some steps towards reduction, which is consistent with 
the Mexican position. 
 131. See EPA, U.S.-Mexico Border 2012, http://www.epa.gov/Border2012 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2009). 
 132. See generally Henrik Selin & Stacy VanDeveer, Climate Leadership in 
Northeast North America (May 18, 2006), http://wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/papervan 
deveer1.pdf; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 172-77 (2004). 
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B.  Likely Characteristics of North American Climate                           
Change Governance 
Flowing from this discussion, there are a number of characteristics 
that North American climate change governance structures are likely to 
exhibit.  First, the approach taken to climate regulation is likely to be 
“bottom-up” in the sense that individual jurisdictions, at both the federal 
and sub-national levels, will put forward commitments based on their 
particular circumstances.133  Regional initiatives will be directed at 
coordinating those efforts by promoting comparability of emissions, 
sharing expertise, and enhancing the efficiency of emissions reduction 
through market mechanisms.  A bottom-up approach suggests that North 
American climate policy will be more focused on implementation than 
commitment creation.  A bottom-up approach does not necessarily mean 
that national governments will not agree to binding emission-reduction 
targets, but these are more likely to occur in the context of multi-lateral 
negotiations.  The absence of hierarchical regional governance structures 
strongly militates against binding regional commitments or highly 
institutionalized approaches to implementation at the regional level, such 
as those that exist in the EU.  Unlike the EU, there are no institutions 
that would provide compliance or dispute settlement functions, and such 
institutions are not likely to develop.134 
Bottom-up approaches will be better able to account for the division of 
legislative authority over climate change that exists in North America 
and will allow existing sub-regional initiatives to develop.  In Canada, 
the federal climate-change policy has been developed so as to co-exist 
with provincial initiatives.  The U.S. federal government has not, to date, 
sought to play a coordinating role among states, and there are some 
indications that increased federal oversight of climate policy will result 
in the pre-emption of some state-based initiatives.  But draft legislation 
appears to maintain a role for state programs.135  A bottom-up approach 
may also appeal to the Mexican government, which appears set to define 
 133. “Bottom-up” approaches are described and advocated by David G. Victor, 
Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of 
Effective Architectures, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 133, 139-40, 151 (Joseph Aldy & Robert 
Stavins eds., 2007) and Scott Barrett, A Multi Track Climate Treaty System, in 
ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-
KYOTO WORLD, supra, at 237, 240-41. 
 134. Even in the highly legalized area of North American trade law, the preference 
has been not to create permanent dispute-settlement bodies. 
 135. For example, under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2454, 111th  Cong. § 335 (2009), state trading programs, such as those 
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reduction targets, even though they will likely be non-binding.  Because 
the degree of environmental policy centralization differs across the 
North American states, there may also be a need to accommodate 
different governmental levels within single-governance structures. 
A bottom-up strategy also allows for the continued development of 
multiple approaches to emissions mitigation and adaptation measures.  
Thus, a second characteristic is that North American climate governance 
will continue to accommodate multiple approaches, allowing states and 
sub-national governments to choose those approaches that suit their 
circumstances.  Again, this is already evident within sub-national 
governments.136  British Columbia has chosen, for example, to use a 
carbon tax, while California has enacted carbon dioxide limits for motor 
vehicles, an approach that is less likely to be embraced in jurisdictions 
with strong automobile-manufacturing sectors.137  The advantage in 
allowing for differentiated regional and sub-regional approaches is that 
jurisdictions and sectors that are policy leaders can be exemplars for 
policy experimentation, which can provide greater certainty to reluctant 
jurisdictions or sectors by demonstrating how reductions may be 
implemented without unacceptable economic impact, leading to 
diffusion and enlargement.138 
Among the approaches likely to be adopted is a cap-and-trade system 
that provides for participation of all three North American states.  
Following from above, it is less likely that the parties will establish a 
unitary continental cap-and-trade system.  Instead, the architecture is 
more likely to build on national and sub-regional systems and provide 
linkage opportunities between systems through inter-system trading and 
offsets.  The caps themselves may be set globally and allocated under 
national or sub-national rules.  Allowing each state to determine the 
coverage of a cap-and-trade system ensures that states may design their 
own systems in accordance with the structure of their economy and in 
light of sub-regional interests.  Cooperation would be required in order 
 136. For a summary of U.S. state climate action plans, see The Center for Climate 
Strategies, supra note 97. 
 137. For example, Ontario has joined the WCI without accepting the California auto 
emission requirements.  See Karen Howlett & Greg Keenan, Deal Lets Ontario Join 
Climate-change Drive, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/2008Aug05.doc. 
 138. See BARRY G. RABE, SECOND GENERATION CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN 
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to ensure that inter-jurisdiction credits are verifiable, permanent and 
additional.  Adopting common methodologies for the calculation and 
verification of credits would be desirable and ought to be more easily 
achieved on a regional scale.  The concerns over CDM credit verification 
and additionality suggest that systems may be more effectively 
implemented among parties, where there is a high degree of trust and 
transparency—139 conditions that are more apt to arise among regional 
trading partners that have high levels of existing integration. 
A third characteristic of regional climate governance in North 
America is that it is likely to include sectoral approaches.  Sectoral 
approaches are currently used in both the APP and the SPP; as a result, 
there may be a path dependant bias in favor of these existing networks.  
Both Canada and Mexico have identified specific sectors for emission 
reductions.140  Determining which sectors may be amenable to regional 
agreements requires further research assessing, inter alia, the degree to 
which the sector operates within a distinct regional market, whether the 
sector accounts for significant amounts of regional GHGs, the extent to 
which the sector’s capital stock will require renewal, and the ability to 
reduce emissions costs effectively.141 
A fourth characteristic is the reliance on research- and development-
based approaches.  Funding research and development has been a significant 
part of existing national climate-change policies, both domestically and 
internationally.  Research and development cooperation on a regional 
scale, as opposed to a global scale, requires special conditions because 
the major advantage of research cooperation is being able to pool funds 
from as many countries as possible, with a particular emphasis on 
including technologically advanced countries.  For example, both Canada 
and the U.S. have a particular interest in developing CCS technology, 
which may itself be deployed on a regional or sub-regional scale; 
capture opportunities may not be located near storage opportunities.142  
CCS may also be an example of a technology that has regional political 
 139. See generally Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s 
Performance and Potential, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008). 
 140. On sectoral approaches, with specific reference to Mexico, see generally CTR. 
FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, INTERIM REPORT: SECTORAL APPROACHES: A PATHWAY TO 
NATIONALLY APPROPRIATE MITIGATION MEASURES (2008), http://www.ccap.org/docs/ 
resources/560/CCAP-sectoral%20interim%20report%20final%20012209.pdf. 
 141. See Bodansky, supra note 29, at 9-11. 
 142. For example, the Weyburn II CO2 Storage Project collects CO2 from a coal 
gasification plant in North Dakota and transports the gas via pipeline to an oilfield in 
Saskatchewan.  See IEA Greenhouse and Gas R&D Programme, Project Details, http://www. 
co2captureandstorage.info/project_specific.php?project_id=140. For a more 
general discussion of CCS, see generally IPCC, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide 
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advantages that favor its development in North America more than 
elsewhere.  In the U.S., CCS would allow for the continued use of coal 
and in Canada it would allow for the continued development of the oil 
sands, perhaps satisfying the demands to two powerful sectoral lobbies, 
both of which have sub-regional power bases.143  Research and 
development may be used in conjunction with sectoral approaches that 
would lead to cooperation on a regional scale.  Barrett argues that the 
benefits from research-based approaches can be better realized where 
there is standardization allowing participants to take advantage of 
economies of scale and network effects.144  Standardization on a regional 
level, such as renewable portfolio standards, could then be coupled with 
research and development cooperation, in renewable energy technologies. 
Funding for research and development on climate change is unlikely 
to be centralized at a regional level in the short or medium term.  The 
North American Development Bank, created as part of the U.S.-Mexico 
Border Environment Cooperation Commission has not yet focused on 
climate- or energy-related projects.145  Mexico is a participant in the 
Inter-American Development Bank that does have a climate-change 
program,146 but Canada and the U.S. are not partners in that institution.  
In the absence of a regional equivalent of the Global Environment 
Facility, research and development funding is more likely to continue on 
its current project or sector-based trajectory.147 
A final point regarding regional climate governance is the critical 
requirement for integration.  Regional climate governance is not an 
alternative to global solutions but, rather, must be understood chiefly as 
a scale for implementation.  In the case of North America, where there is 
a high premium placed on short term flexibility, the environmental 
integrity of such an approach depends upon both vertical integration 
with multi-lateral commitments and processes as well as horizontal 
integration across regional and sub-regional programs and policies.  In 
the absence of strong regional institutions, the form of integration is 
 143. BARRETT, supra note 114, at 253, makes this point in relation to coal. 
 144. Scott Barrett, supra note 133, at 251. 
 145. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission and a North American Development Bank, supra note 130, at ch. 2. 
 146. See Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Energy and Climate Change 
Initiative, http://www.iadb.org/secci/aboutus.cfm?language=English (last visited Nov. 2, 
2009). 
 147. As seen in the APP, for example. 
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unlikely to be hierarchical and coercive.148  Instead, integration efforts 
will need to focus on comparability and complementarity.  Comparability is 
crucial to promote reciprocity among governance units at various scales.  
To a large degree, the acceptance of UNFCCC methodologies in emissions 
inventories and accounting facilitates comparisons between governance 
units, but, as forms of emissions-regulation proliferate, more program- 
and project-specific forms of accounting will need to be developed and 
adopted.  For example, the International Organization for Standards 
provides an important source of GHG accounting and verification tools 
that could be incorporated into a wide variety of instruments.149 
The greater challenge for integration in a decentralized regulatory 
architecture is promoting linkages between various programs.  One 
example of this challenge is the different forms of eligible renewable 
energy that may form part of a renewable portfolio standard.  There 
remains considerable controversy over the role of large-scale hydro and 
nuclear energy within renewable portfolios.150  Ensuring that emissions 
reduction projects are creditable within various emission trading systems 
(and ensuring that projects do not get double counted) will also require a 
high degree of cooperation between market operators.151  Coordination 
at the regional level can promote key standards for accounting and for 
transparency with a view to maximizing the scope of emission trading 
and other credit-based systems, both within the region and with market 
instruments outside the region. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO 
In many respects, Mexico differs from its North American partners, 
with different international commitments and a greater emphasis on 
continued economic development and adaptation.  These differences are 
not, however, incompatible with regional climate governance.  On an 
abstract level, the participation of a developing country in emission 
reduction initiatives provides an important signal to other developing 
economies that emission reduction is not incompatible with development 
 148. For example, the EU is able to aggregate and reallocate individual emissions 
commitments—the EU bubble—through regional legal instruments. 
 149. See International Organization for Standardization, Hot Topics: Climate Change, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/hot_topics/hot_topics_climate_change.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 150. CEC, WHAT IS RENEWABLE?: A SUMMARY OF ELIGIBLE CRITERIA ACROSS 27 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ECONOMY/ 
What-is-Renewable_EN.pdf; see Ian H. Rowlands, Renewable Electricity Politics 
Across Borders 64-67 (May 10, 2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/ 
paperrowlands1.pdf (discussing trade law implications of treating different sources of 
renewable energy unequally). 
 151. See, e.g., WCI, supra note 102, at 10-11 (stressing rigorous accounting for credits). 
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goals.  Given the U.S. government’s strong insistence that other major 
emitters, such as India and China, need to take steps to reduce their 
business-as-usual emissions, Mexican involvement ought to be politically 
attractive. 
Symbols aside, regional cooperation will need to provide suitable 
incentives in order to address Mexico’s development and adaptation 
needs. Important initial steps will be the identification of emissions 
reduction targets and continued development of national emissions 
inventory and accounting systems.152  If Mexico can identify opportunities 
for efficient reductions, it should be able to attract investment in order to 
realize those mitigation opportunities.  Mexico’s current experience with 
generating CDM credits under the Kyoto Protocol indicates a strong 
existing capacity, but it will need to build on that to continue to attract 
those investment funds in a more competitive environment.  A regional 
climate-change framework that provides for the transfer of credit 
reduction units between countries presents a potential advantage to 
Mexico.  Mexico, as the sole developing country, should be able to 
attract strong investment from the U.S. and Canada.  In the event that 
Canada no longer continues within the Kyoto framework after 2012, the 
Canadian government will need to replace the CDM credits currently 
included in its own GHG reduction plan with an alternative.  Mexico 
would likely want to ensure that a regional system is supplemental to the 
CDM under Kyoto since Mexico has been able to attract a high 
proportion of investment under the CDM.153 Ensuring that North 
American initiatives use similar methodologies to those accepted under 
the CDM should help attract investment under both a regional system 
and under Kyoto.  A regional system may provide opportunities for 
credits in areas such as land-use change, which Mexico has identified as 
 152. One system that is already recognized internationally as strong is the Climate 
Change Performance Index, http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ccpi.htm (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2009). 
 153. Mexico has attracted 6.32% of the registered projects under the CDM, an 
amount only exceeded by China (34.77),  India (24.73.%), and Brazil (8.76%).  Note 
these statistics measure only project numbers and not the total amount of certified 
emission reduction credits.  In this latter regard, Mexico has a much smaller share 
(2.89%) of the global CDM market compared with China and India.  UNFCCC, CDC, 
Registerd Project Activities by Host Party, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/ 
NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html (last updated June 11, 2009) (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2009). 
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being a significant source of net GHG reductions, not currently available 
for credit under the CDM. 
Given their affirmation of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
Canada and the U.S. are not likely going to insist that Mexico accept 
binding reduction targets, but “no lose” targets or targets that are linked 
to increases in GDP or carbon intensity levels may provide opportunities 
for joint implementation.  The acceptance of targets by Mexico may 
facilitate investment because the presence of targets allows for better 
demonstration that reductions are real (and not so-called “hot air”).154  
One possible option that may make the acceptance of binding targets 
more feasible for Mexico is the negotiation of some form of side 
payment. A side payment could be linked to capacity-building, 
technology acquisition, or adaptation requirements.  Negotiating side 
payments may be easier in a regional context where the case can be 
made that such payments strengthen the region as a whole.  A regional 
system may be better able to respond to the particular needs of Mexico 
than strictly within the current global framework that tends to view 
developing countries in an undifferentiated fashion. 
There is no North American equivalent to the Global Environment 
Facility that provides climate-change project-financing.  The individual 
development agencies in Canada and the U.S. have provided climate-
change-related funding. For example, the Canadian International 
Development Agency has a climate-change development fund and 
USAID has a similar program.155  The overlapping mandates of these 
programs may provide opportunities for regionally focused cooperation. 
The decentralized nature of climate-change governance in North 
America may present some additional challenges in Mexico where state 
governments and cities are likely to have different capacity levels among 
one another, as well as lower capacity levels than their North American 
counterparts.156  The result may be the development of greater ties 
between the Mexican federal government and sub-state governments and 
 154. “Hot air” is the term often given to projects that do not meet the requirement of 
additionality; that is, that the reductions go beyond business-as-usual reductions. 
 155. The Canada Climate Change Development Fund is described at Canadian 
International Development Agency, Canada Climate Change Development Fund, http:// 
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/home (click “Programs” on the left; 
then click “Specific Programs” on the left; then click “Canada Climate Change Development 
Program” on the left) (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).  The USAID Global Climate Change 
Program is described at USAID Environment: Climate Change Program, Overview, 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 156. The exception to this is Mexico City, which has a sophisticated and ambitious 
climate-change plan.  See Programa de Acción Climática de la Ciudad de México (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.df.gob.mx/wb/gdf/programa_de_accion_climatica 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
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sub-regional climate institutions.  Another possibility is direct engagement 
by private sector actors in sub-regional climate programs.  For example, 
many of the current cooperative initiatives are structured around sectoral 
working groups.  These working groups are not currently set up to 
facilitate capacity-building, and this may hamper their effectiveness.  
Mexico’s ability to link GHG mitigation with development and 
adaptation will also be impacted by the decentralized structure of climate 
governance, as sub-national actors in Canada and the U.S. will have 
different levels of interests in Mexican economic affairs.  Decentralized 
governance may also present opportunities for the Mexican government 
to develop cooperative arrangements with U.S. states that face similar 
climate-change impacts, such as increased water stress and impacts from 
sea level rises. 
Thus, for Mexico, the need for integration operates on a variety of 
levels.  In order to maintain the current flow of benefits through the 
Kyoto mechanisms, Mexico will want to ensure that regional climate-
change programs are compatible with international credit-based programs.  
Horizontal integration is also important because integration of different 
programs will facilitate issue-linkage, and that may better enable Mexico 
to leverage its involvement in mitigation measures in order to achieve its 
other climate-related goals. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to examine the potential for regional climate-
change governance in North America and to further consider the 
possible approaches to climate-change regulation that are more likely to 
be pursued in the short and medium term.  Our conclusions suggest that 
regional climate governance is likely to arise but in a decentralized 
fashion and oriented more towards implementation than commitment-
creation.  Unlike Europe, the absence of strong regional institutions and 
a fragmented system of resource and environment regulation militates 
against a law-based and hierarchical system of regional climate 
governance.  However, a regional approach may be attractive in those 
sectors that are highly integrated within the NAFTA trade area, where 
leakage and competitiveness concerns are higher.  The common focus on 
developing innovative technologies through direct research and 
development funding provides further opportunities for cooperation. 
We are confident that regional cooperation deserves further study and 
consideration by policy officials in North America.  We have identified 
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several areas that, in our view, require further attention.  First, greater 
consideration needs to be given to the impact that the distribution of 
legislative authority over key climate-related areas in each state may 
have on the structure of cooperation.  While all three states have a 
federal structure, the distribution of powers differs from state to state, as 
does the ability of sub-national actors to engage in cooperative activities 
within and beyond the state.  Second, the contribution of existing 
regional environmental institutions to climate governance needs to be 
better understood.  New institutions are costly to create, but delegating 
authority to ill-suited institutions also has costs.  There is a need to 
consider, inter alia, the principal actors engaged within the institution, 
existing levels of expertise in climate change, the kinds of cooperative 
activities the institution can engage in, and the form of decision-making 
processes available to the institution.  The last point is particularly 
important because legitimacy questions, which tend to arise as 
institutions take on more prominent governmental roles, have been raised 
in relation to existing regional arrangements.157 Third, methodologies for 
identifying those sectors that may be amenable to regional climate 
change cooperation need to be developed and then applied to leading 
sectoral candidates.  We expect that sectoral analysis will be principally 
an economic undertaking, but there are also important governance-
related questions regarding the nature and form of sectoral cooperation.  
Lastly, further consideration must be given to the governance of 
integration.  A principal form of regional governance may be a form of 
meta-cooperation, whereby different programs and tracks are linked with 
one another vertically and horizontally. More ambitious forms of 
integration may provide greater benefits in terms of efficiency but may 
conflict with the desire for flexibility. 
 157. See generally Craik & DiMento, supra note 69. 
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• Submitting a national inventory 
of emissions and removals of 
greenhouse gases. 
• Implementing national programs 
to mitigate climate change and 
adapt to its impacts. 
• Strengthening scientific and 
technical research and systematic 
observation related to the climate 
system, and promoting the 
development and diffusion of 
relevant technologies. 
• Promoting education programs 
and public awareness about 
climate change and its likely 
effects. 
• Periodically submitting 
comprehensive National 
Communications (i.e., reports) 
on activities to implement 
commitments under the 
Convention. 
• Developing a national policy and 
specific commitments. 
• Assisting developing countries to 
meet their goals through 
financial aid, technology transfer 
and research support. 
Same as Canada and the 
US, however Mexico is 
NOT required to develop 
a national policy and 
specific commitments 
nor to assist developing 
countries through 
financial aid, tech 
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Protocol 2008/2012 by 2008/2012 








Assisting with 22 
projects, none with 
Mexico (11 in 
South America, 4 
in China, 6 in 




118 projects, most in 
conjunction with UK and 
Switzerland, some with 
Spain and 14 simply 
Mexico 






Calls for enhanced action on all of the UNFCCC  
points from all parties. 
Indicates final negotiations/decisions will take  






NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVES 
NAAEC 
The NAAEC requires that each Party ensure its laws 
provide for high levels of environmental protection 
without lowering standards to attract investment. Each 
Party agrees to effectively enforce its environmental laws 
through the use of inspectors, monitoring compliance and 
pursuing the necessary legal means to seek appropriate 
remedies for violations. Each Party must also provide a 
report on the state of its environment, develop 
environmental emergency preparedness measures, 
promote environmental education, research and 
development, assess environmental impacts and promote 
the use of economic instruments. Parties may also appoint 
National Advisory Committees composed of private 
sector representatives to assist in implementing the 
Agreement domestically.  [from NAAEC Canadian 
 Office website: http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/agreement/ 
agreement_e.htm] 
SPP 
• working towards a joint vision of biofuels for 
transportation by 2020. 
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• shared information on policies and programs on 
vehicle fuel efficiency, standby power consumption, 
and the potential for natural gas to support optimal 
energy use for the future. 
• harmonize a number of energy-using consumer 
products, such as central air conditioners. 
• new suite of products, including clothes washers and 
water heaters, are being assessed under the new 
framework to systematize energy efficiency 
harmonization between all three countries. 
• undertook a comprehensive analysis of various 
emissions inventories among the three countries to 
prepare a trilateral strategy to achieve comparability. 
• road tested emissions estimation methodologies for 
nine energy generating facilities to improve and 
harmonize emissions calculations in the energy 
power. 
• enhance our electricity networks. 
• collaboration to further reduce barriers to expanding 
clean energy technologies, especially carbon dioxide 
capture and storage to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
• working together to improve the safety of chemicals 
in the marketplace. 
[from “Bali Action Plan” down from Orleans meeting; 




OTHER INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 
Asia-Pacific 
Partnership 
• In accordance with our 
respective national 
circumstances, develop, 
deploy and transfer 
cleaner, more efficient 
technologies and to meet 
national pollution 
reduction, energy 
security and climate 
change concerns, 
Not a member 
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consistent with the 
principles UNFCCC. 
• Areas for collaboration 
may include, but not be 
limited to: 
• energy efficiency, 
• clean coal, 
• integrated gasification 
combined cycle, 
• liquefied natural gas, 
• carbon capture and 
storage, 
• combined heat and 
power, 
• methane capture and 
use, 










• agriculture and 
forestry, 
• hydropower, wind 
power, solar power, 
and other renewables. 
• will also cooperate on 
the development, 
diffusion, deployment 
and transfer of longer- 
term transformational 
energy technologies that 
will promote economic 
growth while enabling 
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• Areas for mid- to long-
term collaboration may 








• fusion energy. 




development and energy 
strategies, and explore 
opportunities to reduce 
the greenhouse gas 
intensities of our 
economies. 
• non-binding compact in 
which the elements of 
this shared vision, as 
well as the ways and 
means to implement it, 
will be further defined. 
• we will consider 
establishing a framework 
for the partnership, 
including institutional 
and financial 
arrangements and ways 






Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2002 to 
support the CARICOM countries and help their mitigation 
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efforts with respect to climate change. Canada and the US 
have done so through support for climate change projects 
in Caribbean. 
Does not seem to be any focus on climate change outside 





No specific targets in G8 action 
plan: US President Bush did 
agree economy-wide approach 
needed to achieve absolute 
emission reductions [agreed to 
seriously consider 50% by 
2050]. 
Action Plan included following 
elements: 
• Reviewing building codes, 
appliance standards, and 
vehicle standards to identify 
best practices and 
opportunities for 
coordination; 
• Extending the use of 
labeling on vehicles and 
appliances to raise consumer 
awareness of energy 
consumption; 
• Encouraging multilateral 
development banks to 
expand the use of voluntary 
energy savings assessments 
of proposed investments in 
energy-intensive sectors; 
explore opportunities to 
increase investments in 
renewable energy and 
energy efficiency 
technologies; and work with 
borrower countries to 
identify less greenhouse gas-
intensive growth options. 
• Inviting the World Bank to 
develop and implement 
“best practice” guidelines to 
Not a member but 
participated in summit. 
Called for stronger 
action by developed 
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assess and manage climate 
risks associated with new 
investments in climate-
sensitive sectors; 
• Adopting, where 
appropriate, market-based 
policy frameworks to 
finance the transition to 
cleaner energy; and 
• Promoting dialogue on 
potential policy approaches 
such as long-term sectoral, 
national or international 
policy frameworks; market-
based instruments for the 
development and 
deployment of technologies; 
and the trading of credits for 






[All from Pew Centre 
summary; available on G8 








Wirec 2008 was the third international ministerial level 
conference on renewable energy. It was hosted in 
Washington on March 4-6, 2008. Ministers from federal 
and local governments, industry leaders and civil society 
representatives met to focus on R&D issues, rural 
development and financing of renewable energy sources. 





21 partners and over 600 private sector and civil society 
organizations are members. The Partnership’s goal is to 
encourage “waste” methane recovery and to re-use it as a 
clean energy source. Currently focuses on four areas of  
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methane management: agriculture; coal mines; landfills; 


















17 government members, 
including the EC, have 
partnered to improve the 
development of hydrogen and 
fuel cells as an alternative clean 
energy source. Focused on 
R&D and commercial 








22 governments partnered since 2003 to develop carbon 
sequestration and carbon capture techniques for long-term 
storage and transportation. The group includes six task 
forces: risk assessment, storage capacity estimation, 
projects interaction and review, legal issues, capacity-





Over 70 countries and 40 international organizations 
participate in GEO. The initiative aims to collect climate 
change data, general weather and atmospheric data, and 
other environmental statistics. The partnership helps 





Partnership of ten countries and 
Euratom to encourage the 









Canada joined in Nov. 2007. In 
Sept. 2007, 16 states signed a 
Statement of Principles to 
cooperate to develop and 
Not Involved 
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encourage the use of peaceful  
























Korea and the 








The GBEP Secretariat is managed by the FAO. A 
combination of country and NGO partners are cooperating 
to develop cost-effective biofuels and implement them, 







Multilateral initiative that aims to develop policy and  
legal mechanisms that will assist in renewable energy 
implementation and to facilitate financing for clean energy 
projects. Also helps to share best practices and energy 
smart community planning models. The organization is 
comprised of 8 regional secretariats that include 






Global policy network that aims to develop leadership in 
clean energy technologies. Focuses on policy development 
at sub-national, national, regional and international levels 
to encourage the rapid expansion of renewable energy 
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technology use. Neither Canada nor Mexico appears to be 
directly involved, but UNDP, UNEP and the IEA are all 











NOT INVOLVED IN 
BILATERAL 
AGREEMENT 
In 2005, U.S. and Mexico 
agreed to: 
• Continued cooperation 
on the Methane to 
Markets Initiative 
(M2M). 
• Technical assistance for 





models to support 
decision-making; 
• Cooperation through the 
Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum 
(CSLF) and development 
of projects in geologic 
sequestration for 
consideration by CSLF 
(including the 
nomination of the Campo 
Carmito project for 
certification by the 
CSLF); 
• Cooperation in 
development of 
integrated carbon cycle 
research, building toward 
coordination through the 
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• A robust program of 
clean production 
initiatives, including 
activities designed to 
promote energy 




Additionally, the U.S. and 
Mexico agreed to consider 
joint projects to: 
• Engage in public 
outreach describing U.S.-
Mexico cooperation in 
the area of climate 
change through a joint 
brochure reflecting 
quantifiable projects; 
• Carry out additional joint 
planning for the July, 
2005 economic-
environmental modeling 
workshop to be held in 
Mexico City; 
• Identify ways to move 
forward in the North 
American Carbon 
Program; 
• Discuss possible future 
cooperation in the area  
of  biofuels; 
• Extend existing joint 
modeling programs and 
consider economic 
factors in methane 
recovery; and  
• Discuss additional 
collaborative studies in 
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the area of adaptation, 









Canada, the US and a number of European countries have 
independently initiated debt-for-nature agreements whereby 
they forgive debt owed to them by developing countries in 
exchange for the latter undertaking environmental 
initiatives. Mexico has participated in various debt-for-
nature swaps with other governments and international 










The US partners with 
developing countries on 
a bilateral basis to assist 
them put a stop to illegal 












Similar to the above 
initiative, the US 
partners with 
developing countries on 
a bilateral basis to 
encourage reforestation 




Clean Energy  
Initiative Not involved 
US program designed 
to fund clean energy 











US program designed 
to link funding for 
developing nations to 
increased responsibility 
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 Absolute 20% Cut GHG National target to be 
Targets reduction from 
2006 levels by 
2020 [this will 
bring emissions 
to approx. 600 
Mt which is 









intensity by 18% 
by 2012 
[announced as 
goal in 2002]. 
 








set in 2008. 
 
Special program on cc. 
 
Focus on establishing 
performance 
standards, reporting 










Industry Reduce Direct carbon Develop the combined 
Goals emissions by 





in HFCs by 
2020. 
 
Regs for GHG 
emissions apply 
to 16 sectors. 
 
Credit program 
for early action 
intensity 
reduction of 53% 
from 1990 levels 
by 2010. 
 
Reduce HFCs by 
50% and improve 
fuel efficiency by 
30%. 
 
Reduce PFCs by 
10% below 1995 
baseline by 2010. 
 
Eliminate SF6 
heat and power 
potential of the 
national cement, steel 
and sugar industries. 
 
Eliminate subsidies for 
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Jan. 1, 2008. 
 
Firms may 
contribute to a 
technology 







A further 5 
Mt/year of 








fund will take a 
portfolio 
approach to 
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plants and oil 
sands); new 
plants between 




plants built post 












Install CHP (combined 









(for energy and 
cement 
industries) by 
more than 50%. 
in PEMEX facilities. 
 
Substitute individual 
generation plants for a 
15 MW combined 
cycle plant connected 




target by 5%. 
 
Reduce fugitive NH4 








dependence on oil. 
 
Increase thermal 
efficiency of fuel oil-
fired thermoelectric 
plants by 2%. 
 
Phase out and reorient 
fuel oil production 
incentives; install on 
the Pacific coast a 
gasification terminal 
for imported liquefied 
national gas and 
convert fuel oil-fired 
thermoelectric plants 
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meet goal of 
cutting 
emissions by 25 










Create 90% of 
electricity from 
sources that do 
not emit GHGs. 



























of private enterprise in 
low carbon energy 
generation 
(particularly in CHP 
and renewables). 
Increase efficiency of 
transmission and 
























of current energy 
efficiency  standards 
and develop new ones. 
Strengthen current 
Trust Fund for Energy 
Savings (FIDE) 
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and biofuels to 
reduce gasoline 
use by 20% in 
ten years 
(cellulosic 





produced biofuels, and 
low carbon 
technology. 
Amend the proposed 
Law on the Use of 
Renewable Energy 
Sources to increase 
renewables in overall 
power generation 
above the present 
target of 8%. 
Install 7000 MW of 
renewable energy 
capacity to generate 
16,000 GWh per year 
(additional to the two 
current plants). 
Introduce 500,000 
high efficiency wood 








and heating oil  
Increase supply 
of renewable and 
alternative fuels 
by setting 
mandatory fuel  
Replace freight trucks 
and diesel busses more 
than 10 years old from 
2008 onwards. 
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new cars by 




























standards for cars 






of carbon dioxide 
emissions from 








and reducing fuel 
consumption as 






performance of the 
motorized transport 
fleet by promoting the 
acquisition of vehicles 
with low GHG 
emissions. 
Implement policies to 
promote low carbon 
emissions in public 
transport and 
increased use of rail 
for freight. 















Develop standards for 
fertilizer use according 
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agricultural land to 
perennial and mixed 
crops in 900,000 
hectares. 
Promote alternatives 
to slash and burn 
agriculture in 100,000 
hectares to reduce 
related forest fires. 
Employ conservation 
tillage and foster cover 
crops in 200,000 
hectares. 
Rehabilitate 450,000 











Increase the area under 
sustainable forest 
management by 2.6 
million hectares per 
year. 
Expand coverage of 




reach 2.49 million 
hectares by 2012. 
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Increase coverage of 
Protected Areas by 
500,000 hectares par 
year to accumulate 3 










million hectares of 
tropical, temperate and 








640,000 hectares of 
forest per year. 
Reforest 285,000 
hectares a year to 
accumulate 1.71 
million hectares by 
2012. 
Restore and reforest 
degraded soils in an 
area of 115000 
hectares annually to 
accumulate 690000 
hectares. 
Expand the area in 
commercial 
plantations at a rate of 
10000- hectares per 
year to accumulate 
another 600000 
254 
CRAIK-DIMENTO[1] (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  12:39 PM 
[VOL. 1:  195, 2009]  Climate Law and Policy in North America 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
hectares. 
Identify opportunities 
for carbon capture 
projects in forest 

















Not mentioned in 
federal policy 
documents. 
Establishment of an 
integrated national 
scheme for emissions 
trading through 
medium term. 
Increasing number of 
participating sectors 
and the value of the 




prices which would be 
subject to periodic 









(national oil company) 
into the scheme. 
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focus on public 
information and 
institutional capacity 
to monitor and manage 
risk due to climate 
change. 
Research 













research and $86 
billion to R&D 
tax incentives. 
Research to focus 






























energy generation and 
use; human health. 
Also focus on low 












be beyond the 
20% absolute 
Partner with 
states to adopt a 
variety of clean 
energy policies 
and programs. 
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reduction called 
for by federal 
government 
(but not 
budgeting  
for that 
specifically) 
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